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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the impact of considering key audit matters (KAM) on auditor judgment 
performance and conducted a 2×2 between-subjects experiment based on a goodwill 
impairment testing case with 73 experienced auditors. We manipulated the two independent 
variables KAM consideration (present vs. absent) and client pressure (high vs. low). As 
dependent variables, we captured skeptical judgment and action as different facets of auditor 
judgment performance. Our results suggest that auditors’ reaction to our client pressure 
manipulation is rather weak. If at all, auditors seem to become slightly more skeptical in their 
judgments and actions when client pressure is high, which might suggest that a reasonableness 
constraint has been triggered. Furthermore, we find that auditors exhibit significantly less 
skeptical judgment when KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is 
absent. This suggests that, when considering KAM, auditors are more willing to acquiesce to 
their clients’ desired accounting treatments due to moral licensing. 
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1. Introduction 
The disclosure of key audit matters (KAM), i.e., “matters that, in the auditor’s professional 
judgment, were of most significance in the audit […]” (IAASB 2015a, paragraph 8), can be 
seen as one of the most prominent changes of the auditor’s report since decades. For the first 
time, the auditor’s report refrains from boilerplate wording, but rather provides insights into the 
auditor’s work and, thus, detailed client-specific information are now publicly available for 
users. This concept is reflected by the new IAASB International Standard on Auditing ISA 701 
‘Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report’, which was published 
in January 2015 and is effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 
December 15, 2016.  
There is some early evidence regarding the effect of a KAM section within the three 
following domains: Auditor liability (Backof, Bowlin, and Goodson 2014; Brasel, Doxey, 
Grenier, and Reffett 2016; Brown, Majors, and Peecher 2015; Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 
2016a; Kachelmeier, Schmidt, and Valentine 2015), aggregated capital market reactions 
(Lennox, Schmidt, and Thompson 2016), and individual investors’ decisions or assessments 
(Christensen, Glover, and Wolfe 2014;1 Köhler, Ratzinger-Sakel, and Theis 2016). The 
preliminary behavioral evidence concerning the studies on auditor liability suggest that KAM 
sections regarding subsequent litigation either reduce or do not influence auditor liability. 
However, a KAM section that specifically relates to the litigation issue may increase liability 
for two conditions. One, when the accounting standards are precise. Two, when the auditor 
discloses additional procedures performed to address the higher risk associated with the KAM 
(Gimbar, Hansen, and Ozlanski 2016b). With respect to aggregated market reactions, the 
 
1 The majority of these evidence is generated based on critical audit matters (CAM). CAM reflect the PCAOB’s 
implementation of enhancing the auditor’s reporting model in terms of communicating auditor insights to investors 
about critical audit issues. However, CAM are considered to be conceptually equivalent to KAM. Consequently, 
for the sake of consistency, we use the term KAM even if the original text refers to CAM. 
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empirical evidence shows that investors do not find the expanded information in the auditor’s 
report incrementally informative (Lennox et al. 2016). However, for individual investors’ 
decisions, Christensen et al.’s (2014) experiment documents that investors who receive a KAM 
section are more likely to change their investment decision than are investors who receive a 
standard (i.e., old) audit report or investors who receive the same KAM section information in 
a management’s footnote. However, the effect of a KAM section is reduced when offering a 
resolution paragraph.  
Not only seemingly rather unattended by the IAASB,2 but also lacking research 
evidence,3 is the possibility that requiring auditors to determine and report on KAM has side 
effects. The possibility of the occurrence of unintended consequences of a KAM section is 
acknowledged by the PCAOB based on practical deliberations (see PCAOB 2016 for further 
details). More specifically, the communication of KAM could potentially lead to changes in 
auditor behavior with either positive or negative effects on auditor judgment performance 
and/or audit quality. In addition, theoretical concepts rooted in psychology and prior audit 
research suggest that the necessity to consider KAM on a specific audit area might impact 
auditor judgment performance. In particular, in the context of auditing goodwill impairment 
testing, it seems possible that considering KAM either improves or impairs judgment 
performance, e.g. through goal commitment or a moral licensing effect. Consequently, the aim 
of this study is to assess the potential impact of considering KAM on auditor judgment 
performance. To address the aim of our study, reflecting the practical and theoretical dichotomy 
regarding the potential effect of KAM on auditor judgment performance, we use a competing 
 
2 To our knowledge, only the “Basis for Conclusions: Reporting on Audited Financial Statements – New and 
Revised Auditor Reporting Standards and Related Conforming Amendments” acknowledges the possibility that 
an additional focus on KAM “to be reported could indirectly result in an increase in professional skepticism and 
additional attention by the auditor on significant audit risks” (IAASB 2015b, 8). 
3 We are only aware of one unpublished working paper that examines whether reporting an accounting estimate 
as a KAM can influence auditor judgment (Asbahr and Ruhnke 2017). 
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hypotheses approach based on implications of motivated reasoning and goal commitment vs. 
moral licensing theory. 
In addition, we include client pressure in investigating the impact of considering KAM 
on auditor judgment performance. This is of high relevance, because client pressure has been 
identified to pose a considerable threat to auditor judgment performance by previous literature. 
Dependent on the direction of the direct effect KAM consideration has on auditor judgment 
performance (improvement vs. impairment), KAM consideration might either represent an 
instrument to effectively debias auditor judgment performance under high client pressure, or 
amplify the effect high client pressure has on auditor judgment performance. 
We carry out our study using a 2×2 between-subjects experiment based on a goodwill 
impairment testing case for the fictitious German electronics manufacturer Alpha. In our 
experiment with 73 experienced auditors from two Big4 audit firms in Germany,4 we 
manipulated the two independent variables KAM consideration (present vs. absent) and client 
pressure (high vs. low). With regard to the former independent variable, in the condition in 
which KAM consideration is present, participants were required to assess the likelihood that 
they will communicate matters regarding the estimation of the recoverable amount5 in a 
separate KAM section of the independent auditor’s report. We opposed this condition with a 
condition where KAM consideration is absent, hence, where participants were required to 
assess the likelihood that they will communicate matters regarding the estimation of the 
recoverable amount only with those charged with governance. In line with Hatfield, Jackson, 
and Vandervelde (2011), the manipulation of the latter independent variable (client pressure) 
 
4 For more details, see section 3. 
5 As we conduct the experiment in an European normative environment, the case refers to IFRS in general and 
IAS 36 (IASB 2016) in particular. This is reflected by the terms used in this paper with regard to goodwill 
impairment. See also further descriptions in the section “Task”. 
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contains two different components: client importance and client opposition to making audit 
adjustments. 
As dependent variables, we capture two facets of auditor judgment performance. First, 
we asked participants to assess the reasonableness of Alpha’s estimation of the recoverable 
amount for the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit (“skeptical judgment”). 
Second, we asked participants to indicate the likelihood that they will require Alpha to adjust 
the estimation of the recoverable amount (“skeptical action”). In this regard, it is important to 
underline that our experimental design allows us to draw a (careful) conclusion with regard to 
whether our manipulations improve or impair auditor judgment performance. As we seeded 
several issues that suggest that the recoverable amount is overstated, more conservative 
assessments and hence, more skeptical judgments and actions, tend to be more appropriate and 
represent better auditor judgment performance (see also Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, and 
Young 2015 for a comparable approach). 
Our results with regard to the independent variable client pressure suggest that auditors’ 
reaction to our client pressure manipulation is rather weak and insignificant (based on 
ANOVAs). In an overall picture, if at all, auditors seem to become slightly more skeptical in 
their judgments and actions when client pressure is high. This direction of the effect would be 
contrary to our Hypothesis 1 which we derive from moral reasoning theory and might suggest 
that a reasonableness constraint has been triggered. Tests of mechanisms, based on the 
estimation of a structural equation model (SEM), further support this conclusion.  
With regard to the independent variable KAM consideration, we find that auditors 
exhibit significantly less skeptical judgment when KAM consideration is present than when 
KAM consideration is absent. This suggests that, when considering KAM and due to moral 
licensing, auditors are more willing to acquiesce to their client’s desired accounting treatments 
(Hypothesis 2b). While the moral licensing effect seems to be dominant, based on the SEM, we 
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can provide empirical evidence that KAM consideration also induces a reverse effect on 
auditors’ willingness to acquiesce to the client’s preferred accounting through goal commitment 
(Hypothesis 2a). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the potential impact 
of considering KAM on auditor judgment performance. By showing that KAM consideration 
leads to less skeptical judgment, we document that the new KAM reporting requirement – 
intended to improve the communicative value of the auditor’s report for users (IAASB 2012) – 
comes at the expense of auditor judgment performance. It seems as if auditors who consider 
KAM feel morally licensed to acquiesce to clients’ desired accounting treatments. This finding 
is of interest for auditors and regulators, as well as users and prepares, by highlighting 
unintended consequences of KAM reporting. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop the paper’s 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental design as well as the participants. Section 4 
reports the results as well as tests of mechanisms and additional analyses, and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Motivated Reasoning and Goal Commitment 
The motivated reasoning literature has found that individuals’ decision processes are influenced 
by their goals and that “individuals committed to directional goals, or goals to reach a preferred 
conclusion, are more likely to reach their desired conclusion” (Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher 
2003, 762; see also Kunda 1990, 1999). Consistent with motivated reasoning, previous studies 
find that auditors tend to exploit ambiguity inherent in accounting standards to justify client-
preferred accounting (Hatfield et al. 2011; see also Ng and Tan 2003; Lord and DeZoort 2001; 
Salterio and Koonce 1997), when they have this respective directional goal (Hackenbrack and 
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Nelson 1996; Kadous et al. 2003). Kadous et al. (2003) furthermore argue that auditor 
acceptance of client-preferred accounting increases with goal commitment, i.e. auditors’ 
tendency of having directional goals to support client management’s accounting choices and 
engaging in directional processing, and find that performing a quality assessment (as required 
by, e.g., SAS No. 90, see AICPA 2000) amplifies this effect. Consequently, with regard to our 
experiment, goal commitment would have a positive effect on auditors’ assessment of the 
likelihood that the recoverable amount is reasonable (hence, leads to less skeptical judgment) 
and a negative impact on the assessment of the likelihood to require an adjustment of the 
recoverable amount (hence, leads to less skeptical action). 
When client management exerts pressure on auditors, “audit partners and senior 
managers […] may have a bias towards accepting management’s perspective” (PCAOB 2011, 
7). In how far client pressure might in fact impair auditor judgment performance, depends on 
several factors. Koch and Salterio (2015) argue that auditors who face very salient pressure to 
accept the client’s aggressive accounting, likely “default to ingrained professional responses to 
deal with such challenges” (Koch and Salterio 2015, 11; see also Bauer 2015; Teoh 1992). 
Respective professional responses include, inter alia, developing an independent view or 
challenging management’s conclusions (PCAOB 2011, 7). The application of ingrained 
professional responses is especially probable under circumstances where client pressure 
triggers the so-called reasonableness constraint (Boiney, Kennedy, and Nye 1997). The 
“reasonableness” criteria relates to the idea that auditors (or individuals in general) do not 
boundlessly follow directional goals, but rather as long as they can construct a case for 
themselves that makes them believe that an impartial third party would perceive the auditor as 
acting in a professional manner when evaluating client accounting. The “constraint” may be 
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triggered if auditors feel challenged in their professional self-image, i.e. if they perceive a very 
high level of client pressure (Koch and Salterio 2017; see also Kadous et al. 2003).6 
However, if client pressure is more subtle, auditors might have a greater focus on their 
commercial self-interest to maintain a solid and long-lasting relationship with the client. This 
in turn might lead auditors towards interpreting contextual facts so that the accounting preferred 
by the client seems acceptable (Koch and Salterio 2015; see also Hackenbrack and Nelson 
1996), i.e. motivated reasoning. While client management may exert economic pressure upon 
the auditor by threatening to reduce audit/non-audit fees or to switch the auditor (Windsor and 
Kavanagh 2012), client management’s (perceived) bargaining power will depend on the 
(economic) relevance the client has for the (engagement) auditor (or audit firm). 
Based on the foregoing theoretical deliberations and in line with prior studies we predict 
that client pressure increases goal commitment and, consequently, auditor acceptance of client-
preferred accounting. With regard to our dependent variables and drawing from the general 
effect of goal commitment, we formally state the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Auditors will exhibit less skeptical judgment and skeptical action when 
client pressure is high than when client pressure is low. 
While goal commitment has been found to be increased by client pressure (e.g. Kadous 
et al. 2003), the effect of KAM consideration on auditors’ directional goal to justify client-
preferred accounting has not been investigated thus far. In the context of auditing an accounting 
situation where authoritative guidance does not exist, Salterio and Koonce (1997) find that, 
when a client’s position on an accounting matter is known to the auditor, and available 
precedents point to the same treatment of the accounting issue, auditors do not follow the 
client’s position. However, when the available precedents are mixed with regard to their 
 
6 Koch and Salterio (2017) furthermore argue that the effect high or explicit client pressure has on auditor judgment 
is an on-average effect which is contingent on an auditor’s perception of client pressure salience. 
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implications for treating the accounting issue, “auditors tend to follow the client’s position” 
(Salterio and Koonce 1997, 573). Trompeter (1994) argues that highly specific accounting 
standards limit auditors’ range of acceptable options. Conversely, ambiguity in accounting 
standards might increase auditors’ willingness to follow the client’s position. In the same vain, 
however from a perception point of view, Gimbar et al. (2016a) find that jurors perceive precise 
accounting standards to constrain auditors’ control over financial reporting outcomes, which in 
turn leads to a lower propensity for negligence verdicts when the accounting treatment 
conforms to the precise standard. However, the authors can show that either imprecise standards 
or KAM reduce the extent to which jurors perceive this constraint to exist, resulting in increased 
auditor liability. Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) outline that auditors respond to moderate 
engagement risk by permitting the aggressive reporting method preferred by the client and 
justified their choice with aggressive interpretation of the applicable accounting standard. Yet, 
when confronted with high engagement risk, the auditors respond “by requiring conservative 
reporting and justified their choice with conservative interpretations of accounting standards.” 
To summarize, while auditors seem to exhibit a tendency to accept client-preferred accounting 
in situations where there is leeway, the outlined findings also suggest that auditors might default 
to ingrained professional responses if circumstances so require. Since reporting issues within 
(a) KAM section(s) impose the pressure to justify the auditor’s causal interpretations of the 
matter at hand to the addressees of the independent auditor’s report outside the immediate 
sphere of the client, it seems reasonable to assume that the consideration of KAM decreases 
auditor acceptance of client-preferred accounting through reduced goal commitment. In other 
words, based on the implications of goal commitment, we would argue that auditors will exhibit 
more skeptical judgment and skeptical action when they consider KAM. However, in the 
following, we want to discuss another, yet related theoretical construct that seems relevant in 
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the context of KAM consideration and would have different implications for the impact on 
auditor judgment performance. 
Moral Licensing 
Literature on moral licensing argues that disclosure might exacerbate biases, “because 
information providers are more comfortable providing biases when information recipients have 
been forewarned about the estimates’ potential inaccuracy” (Griffin 2014, 1173; see also Cain, 
Loewenstein, and Moore 2011; Boiney et al. 1997). This effect has in particular been shown in 
contexts that involve conflicts of interest (Jamal 2012). Previous studies have shown that when 
people act in a way that increases their sense of their own ethicality, they feel “licensed” to act 
in a self-serving or even unethical manner (Jamal 2012; see for example Monin and Miller 
2001, Miller and Effron 2010, Wilcox, Vallen, Block, and Fitzsimons 2009). For example, in 
an accounting context, Jamal, Marshall, and Tan (2016) find that disclosure of a conflict of 
interest increases bias in accountants’ valuation estimates in favor of the client. 
According to Jamal (2012), auditors might be particularly prone to moral licensing, as 
they face the conflict of interest of being charged with serving the public interest and being paid 
by their client at the same time. This reasoning clearly overlaps with the implications of 
motivated reasoning (Jamal 2012). Griffin (2014) argues that, in an auditing setting, “moral 
licensing could mean that auditors will be more willing to acquiesce to their clients’ desired 
accounting treatments, believing either that the disclosure provides a suitable defense for not 
requiring adjustments […], or that disclosure fulfills the auditors’ fiduciary duty to ensure that 
the investing public has been informed” (Griffin 2014, 1173).  
Clearly, the disclosure of KAM usually does not represent the disclosure of a conflict 
of interest for the auditor as used in prior moral licensing studies. More specifically, the auditor 
would for example not utilize KAM communication to disclose the conflict of interest of being 
charged with serving the public interest and being paid by the client. However, KAM 
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communication might very well function in accordance with the implications of moral 
licensing, when a KAM is understood to be a disclaimer with regard to the matters described. 
In fact, preliminary behavioral evidence on the effect of KAM on auditor liability from the 
perspective of users of the independent auditor’s report suggest that KAM sections regarding 
subsequent litigation either reduce or do not influence (perceived) auditor liability (Gimbar et 
al. 2016a). 
Recapitulating the different theoretical implications and reflecting the theoretical 
dichotomy regarding the effect KAM consideration potentially has on auditor judgment 
performance, we chose to formally state two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, based on 
the implications of motivated reasoning and goal commitment, it seems reasonable to assume 
that auditors will exhibit more skeptical judgment and action when they consider KAM. Hence, 
we state the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 2a. Auditors will exhibit more skeptical judgment and skeptical action 
when KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is absent. 
On the other hand, drawing from the implications of moral licensing, the opposite seems 
to be theoretically true as well. Consequently, the competing hypothesis reads as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2b. Auditors will exhibit less skeptical judgment and skeptical action when 
KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is absent. 
Including client pressure in the investigation of the effect of KAM consideration on 
auditor judgment performance is highly relevant. As outlined above, client pressure has been 
identified to pose a considerable threat to auditor judgment performance by previous literature. 
If KAM consideration reduces goal commitment and thus decreases auditor acceptance of 
client-preferred accounting (Hypothesis 2a), KAM consideration might in fact represent an 
instrument to effectively debias auditor judgment performance under high client pressure. If, 
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however, auditors are more willing to acquiesce to their client’s preferred accounting treatments 
when considering KAM due to a moral licensing effect (Hypothesis 2b), KAM consideration 
likely amplifies the effect high client pressure has on auditor judgment performance. Hence, 
dependent on the direction of the direct effect KAM consideration has on auditor judgment 
performance, the shape of an interaction effect between KAM consideration and client pressure 
differs. Combining the implications of Hypothesis 1/Hypothesis 2a vs. Hypothesis 
1/Hypothesis 2b, we formally state the following – again competing – hypotheses for the 
interaction effect: 
HYPOTHESIS 3a. When KAM consideration is present, the effect high client pressure 
has on skeptical judgment and skeptical action is mitigated. 
HYPOTHESIS 3b. When KAM consideration is present, the effect high client pressure 
has on skeptical judgment and skeptical action is amplified. 
Potential Mediators 
We also investigate the mechanisms through which KAM consideration (present vs. absent) 
and client pressure (high vs. low) affect our dependent variables (skeptical judgment and 
skeptical action). First, we are interested in goal commitment as a potential mediator. To 
measure goal commitment, we draw on the scale used by Kadous et al. (2003), which requires 
participants to provide agreement ratings on different goals. The scale had been refined and 
validated by Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, Wright, and DeShon (2001) and is based on a more 
comprehensive scale developed by Hollenbeck, Williams, and Klein (1989). Due to time 
constraints and in line with previous literature, we only confront participants with the one 
directional goal relevant from a motivated reasoning perspective in an auditing context: to 
justify client-preferred accounting. More specifically, we provide the goal to “build a justifiable 
case for characterizing Alpha’s estimation of the recoverable amount to be acceptable in the 
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circumstances” and capture participants’ agreement ratings on the five items shown in Table 1 
(see also Kerler and Brandon 2010).7 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Second, we also include work effort as a potential mediator in our analysis. To control 
for differences in effort exerted by participants is very important because of two reasons. One, 
effort has been found to positively affect auditor judgment performance (Libby and Luft 1993; 
Libby and Lipe 1992; Cloyd 1997) and hence, differences in effort exerted might explain 
results. Two, systematic differences in effort exerted related to the independent variable KAM 
consideration might help to shed light on the mechanisms through which KAM consideration 
affects our dependent variables. In particular, we argue that if the KAM consideration present 
condition was associated with less work effort, this would be indicative of a moral licensing 
effect: auditors feel licensed to exert less effort and have less motivation to conduct a thorough 
audit. We measure work effort by asking participants for a self-assessment of how hard they 
worked on the provided case (on a 11-points Likert scale with endpoints labeled as “not at all 
hard” and “extremely hard”). Figure 1 shows the outline of the structural equation model (SEM) 
that we estimated in order to investigate the mechanisms through which client pressure and 
KAM consideration affect our dependent variables. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
  
 
7 With regard to the five items, high ratings on items x1 and x2 and low ratings on items x3-x5 correspond with 
high goal commitment. 
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3. Method 
Experimental Design and Participants 
We used a paper-and-pencil based 2×2 between-subjects experimental design8 and manipulated 
the two independent variables KAM consideration (present vs. absent) and client pressure (high 
vs. low).9 We conducted the experiment with 73 experienced auditors of two German Big4 
audit firms.10 The 73 auditors in our sample possess an average work experience in the audit 
profession of 5.97 years (SD = 5.09; median = 5), with 26 of the participants being certified 
auditors. 21.43 percent/18.57 percent of the participants are consultants/senior consultants, 
40.00 percent/4.29 percent of the participants are managers/senior managers, and 15.71 percent 
of the participants are directors or partners. 32.82 percent of the participants are female. 
Task 
We provided participants with a comprehensive auditing case study.11 The case study contained 
information on the fictitious German electronics manufacturer Alpha. Participants learned that 
Alpha is a German publicly traded corporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”) listed in the German 
 
8 To ensure that participants could not revise previously given answers when working on subsequent parts of the 
experimental materials, we split up the materials to four envelopes which had to be opened and sealed in a specific 
sequence. 
9 The design of the experiment meets the requirements for using human subjects in the experimental laboratory at 
the university where one of the authors is located. The use of human subjects was also approved by the audit firms. 
10 Each of the two Big4 audit firms reserved slots for the experiment on staff training days. The three sessions took 
place within several weeks around the turn of the year of 2016/17. Since ISA 701 is effective for audits of financial 
statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 2016, at that time, (senior) auditors should have had 
knowledge of, but limited experience with KAM. In fact, 80.85 percent of our participants indicated that they had 
heard about KAM before they participated in our experiment. Our initial sample comprises 182 persons. Herein 
included are 25 IT staff who participated in one of the training days together with experienced auditors. Since we 
could not exclude them from participating in the experiment ex ante, we deleted their responses from the sample 
ex post. Furthermore, we excluded 52 participants who failed our manipulation check in the post experimental 
questionnaire related to the independent variable KAM consideration. Of the remaining participants, we do not 
consider 32 participants who had not more than 6 months of or did not indicate their work experience in auditing 
(of those 32 participants, 15 did not provide their work experience in years). 
11 We based our experimental material on the Trueblood Gator Electronics case study which is available online for 
teaching and academic research (see Deloitte 2016). Since we conducted the experiment in an European normative 
environment, we had to significantly adapt the original (US-GAAP and US Auditing Standards based) case study. 
Our case study was carefully reviewed and improved by two senior auditors of two Big4 audit firms before we 
conducted the experiment. 
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Prime Standard and that Alpha publishes group financial statements (in line with IFRS).12 The 
case study furthermore contained specific information on Alpha’s goodwill impairment 
analysis for the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit in line with IAS 36, including 
valuation schedules and detailed information on management’s assumptions underlying the 
estimation of the value in use. 
According to IAS 36, an asset is impaired when its carrying amount exceeds its 
recoverable amount (IASB 2016, paragraph 8). The standard thereby defines the recoverable 
amount as the higher of an asset’s or cash-generating unit’s fair value less costs of disposal and 
its value in use (IASB 2016, paragraph 18). Participants are informed that, on the basis of its 
own valuation, Alpha has estimated that the recoverable amount of all cash generating units 
exceeded their respective carrying amount. Hence, a goodwill impairment did not occur. 
The participants were instructed to assume that they are the engagement partner and in 
charge of the current audit of Alpha’s group financial statements for the financial year ending 
on December 31, 2015,13 and that they are planning to audit the current-year goodwill 
impairment analysis of the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit. Thereby, 
participants learned that their audit firm has also audited Alpha’s group financial statements for 
the past two years.14 Participant are informed that they had determined earlier that goodwill for 
 
12 ISA 701 would require Alpha’s group auditor to report on KAM for audits of financial statements for periods 
ending on or after December 15, 2016 (see IAASB 2015a). 
13 While Alpha generally qualifies as a group for which the group auditor would have to report on KAM in line 
with ISA 701, reporting is only mandatory for audits of financial statements ending on or after December 15, 2016. 
However, voluntary earlier application of ISA 701 is possible (IAASB 2015b, paragraph 7). This is important for 
our manipulation of the independent variable KAM consideration, as both the condition in which KAM 
consideration is present, as well as the condition in which KAM consideration is absent, is plausible for an audit 
of financial statements ending on December 31, 2015. 
14 We chose the outlined auditor tenure with purpose: providing no information on tenure, or setting tenure either 
very short (i.e., one year) or very long (i.e., many years) seems to bear the risk of inducing unintended biases (see 
comprehensive literature on auditor tenure, e.g., Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007, Ghosh and Moon 2005, Carcello 
and Nagy 2004, Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). Instead, we set auditor tenure to be moderate and chose three 
years because Alpha’s estimation of the value in use is based on free cash flows derived from audited financial 
statements for the financial years ending on December 31, 2013 and 2014, and the (unaudited) current financial 
statements for the financial year ending on December 31, 2015. Hence, participants should not worry much about 
the reliability of historical figures in Alpha’s estimation, since their own audit firm has performed the audit. 
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the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit is a material account balance as of 
December 31, 2015, because it is quantitatively significant (280 million EUR) and qualitatively 
significant because its susceptibility to misstatement arising primarily from recent market 
declines. 
Participants could understand from the provided materials that the carrying amount of 
the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit amounts to 730,000 TEUR, that the fair 
value less costs of disposal amounts to 700,000 TEUR, and that the value in use amounts to 
1,040,292 TEUR.15 We informed participants that Alpha’s estimation of the fair value less costs 
of disposal is based on a competitor’s recent purchase offer and that their team has already 
evaluated the appropriateness of the estimation. Our intention was that participants do not 
further worry about the fair value less costs of disposal, but rather focus on Alpha’s estimation 
of the recoverable amount. In this regard, we tell participants that their team has only evaluated 
the mathematical accuracy of the model and that, consequently, their job will be to evaluate 
Alpha’s assumptions underlying the estimation of the value in use of the “Europe without 
Germany” cash generating unit and to form a preliminary conclusion about its reasonableness. 
To determine the value in use, Alpha has used a discounted cash flow method (free cash 
flow approach). Alpha’s projections of future revenue, operating expenses, capital 
expenditures, and the estimated weighted average cost of capital (WACC) are important drivers 
of the cash generating unit’s equity value (= value in use) (Griffith et al. 2015). For the purpose 
of our study it was important that Alpha’s goodwill impairment analysis of the “Europe without 
Germany” cash generating unit bears the potential to qualify as a matter to be communicated 
as KAM. Hence, we seeded several issues that suggest that the recoverable amount is 
overstated. The model indicates a significant increase in revenue, EBITDA, and cash flows over 
 
15 Since the fair value less costs of disposal falls below the value in use, it is the value in use that leads to the 
conclusion that an impairment of the cash generating unit is not necessary. 
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the projected period (see for all issues also Deloitte 2016). In particular, (1) there is a large 
growth in total revenue of 11.21 percent in 2017, and (2) the growth rate in the last projected 
period 2020 (5.07 percent) lies substantially above the expected long-term growth rate of 
3.0 percent. Furthermore, (3) projected capital expenditures do not track the expected growth 
in revenue over the projected period, which would ordinarily be the case. Finally, (4) the 
working capital assumption for the projected periods is 0 percent, and working capital as a 
percentage of incremental revenue appears to be low based on current levels of working capital 
and revenue.16 Each of the four issues ceteris paribus increases the estimated amount of the 
equity value of the cash generating unit. We emphasize that our seeded issues were not 
supposed to qualify as formal errors, but rather to make Alpha’s hockey stick projections 
salient. While the goodwill impairment analysis should bear the potential to qualify as a matter 
to be communicated as KAM, it was necessary to avoid that participants think of it in terms of 
a modified or adverse opinion. 
It is important to underline that our experimental design allows us to draw a (careful) 
conclusion with regard to whether our manipulations improve or impair auditor judgment 
performance. As we seeded several issues that suggest that the recoverable amount is 
overstated, more conservative assessments and hence, more skeptical judgments and skeptical 
actions, tend to be more appropriate and represent better auditor judgment performance (see 
also Griffith et al. 2015 for a comparable approach). 
Independent Variables 
We look at the impact of the two independent variables KAM consideration and client pressure 
on auditor judgment performance. The following manipulations are implemented in the 
 
16 As already outlined before, our case study was carefully reviewed and improved by two senior auditors of two 
Big4 audit firms before we conducted the experiment. In particular, the senior auditors confirmed that the seeded 
issues should be potentially identifiable by our participants. However, they argued that the salience of issues (1) 
and (2) is greater than the salience of issues (3) and (4). Furthermore, the senior auditors confirmed that our (final) 
case study is very realistic. 
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introductory part of the case study, where participants receive rather general information on 
Alpha and their own role. Most importantly, participants receive the treatment before they work 
on the task. 
The independent variable KAM consideration is manipulated as follows. While it can 
be assumed that senior auditors have either received training on, or are at least informed about 
KAM, more junior auditors may not have the same knowledge. As a consequence, levels of 
knowledge might differ between participants.17 Hence, we chose to include a reminder on KAM 
requirements in the KAM consideration present condition. There, we first of all provide 
participants with the following very basic information on KAM: 
“Furthermore, assume that you are required to communicate key audit matters (KAM) 
in a separate section of the independent auditor’s report under the heading “Key Audit 
Matters” in line with ISA 701. KAM are those matters that, in the auditor’s professional 
judgment, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements and are 
selected from matters communicated with those charged with governance, but are not 
intended to represent all matters that were discussed with them.”18 
Then, participants also learn: “At some point during your work on this case you will be 
asked to assess the likelihood that you will communicate matters regarding Alpha’s 
estimation of the recoverable amount for the “Europe without Germany” cash 
generating unit in the separate Key Audit Matters section of the independent auditor’s 
report.” 
Hence, in this condition, participants consider whether it is likely that the evaluation of 
Alpha’s assumptions underlying the estimation of the value in use of the “Europe without 
 
17 For, example, it is likely that a (senior) auditor who is mostly auditing larger listed clients, has deeper insights 
into KAM than a (senior) auditor who is mainly working for smaller non-listed clients. In fact, we control for 
participants’ prior knowledge on KAM (see also footnote 10). 
18 The wording of this passage is derived from ISA 701, see IAASB 2015a, paragraph 9. 
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Germany” cash generating unit and forming a preliminary conclusion about its reasonableness 
is a KAM or not. As a post experimental question, we later indeed capture participants’ 
assessment of the likelihood that they will communicate matters regarding Alpha’s estimation 
of the recoverable amount for the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit in the 
separate Key Audit Matters section of the independent auditor’s report. 
Designing the condition in which participants should not consider KAM (KAM 
consideration absent condition) is more challenging. Since KAM are not mandatory for 
financial statements for the financial year ending on December 31, 2015, an auditor working 
through our case study would not naturally consider KAM if the case study was silent on KAM. 
However, just being silent on KAM in the condition in which we do not want auditors to 
consider KAM, did not seem appropriate. We rather chose to draw the participants’ attention 
to the extant communication requirements of ISA 260 and assume that the participants will 
neglect any potential consideration of KAM. Instead, we therefore instruct participants as 
follows: 
“Furthermore, assume that you are required to provide those charged with governance 
with timely observations arising from the audit that are significant and relevant to their 
responsibility to oversee the financial reporting process in line with ISA 260. Matters 
to be communicated include, e.g., the auditor’s views about significant qualitative 
aspects of the entity’s accounting practices, significant difficulties, if any, encountered 
during the audit, and other matters, if any, arising from the audit that, in the auditor’s 
professional judgment, are significant to the oversight of the financial reporting 
process.”19 
 
19 The wording of this passage is derived from ISA 260, see IAASB 2015c, paragraphs 16, 21. 
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Then, participants also learn: “At some point during your work on this case you will be 
asked to assess the likelihood that you will communicate matters regarding Alpha’s 
estimation of the recoverable amount for the “Europe without Germany” cash 
generating unit with those charged with governance.” 
Again, as a post experimental question, we later indeed capture participants’ assessment 
of the likelihood that they will communicate matters regarding Alpha’s estimation of the 
recoverable amount for the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit with those charged 
with governance. 
Hence, in the condition in which we do not want auditors to consider KAM, we confront 
them with the well-known standard requirement to communicate relevant matters with those 
charged with governance in line with ISA 260 “Communication with those charged with 
Governance” (IAASB 2015c).20 Because KAM are selected from the matters communicated 
with those charged with governance (IAASB 2015a, paragraph 8), in both conditions, the 
salience of and the perceived risk associated with the goodwill impairment issue at hand should 
be rather similar.21 Consequently, as intended, observed differences in auditor judgment 
performance should relate to an aspect that distinguishes KAM requirements from the 
requirement to communicate with those charged with governance: publicly communicating 
matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgment, were of most significance in the audit, to 
external users of the independent auditor’s report. 
 
20 Please note that ISA 260 was revised in connection with the introduction of KAM. The revision mainly relates 
to the fact that KAM are selected from the matters communicated with those charged with governance. While the 
revision of ISA 260 and the introduction of KAM should lead to more intense communication between the auditor 
and those charged with governance, the revision of ISA 260 does not affect our manipulation. 
21 Participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that they will communicate matters regarding Alpha’s 
estimation of the recoverable amount for the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit in the separate key 
audit matters section of the independent auditor’s report/with those charged with governance on a 11-points Likert 
scale with endpoints labeled as “not at all likely” and “extremely likely”. Mean responses for the KAM 
consideration present/absent conditions are 6.86 and 7.07, respectively, and do not differ significantly. This also 
suggest that auditors do not exhibit a general reluctance to report on KAM, which could have had implications for 
the interpretation of our results. 
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Intentionally, we manipulated KAM consideration as opposed to the act of reporting 
KAM itself out of several reasons. First, telling participants that the matter at hand qualifies as 
a KAM that has to be reported should significantly impact their judgments and should preclude 
assessments representing low levels of skeptical judgment and skeptical action. Second, the 
definition of KAM suggests that the decision to report a matter at hand in the independent 
auditor’s report as a KAM should rather be the outcome of performing the audit and the result 
of auditor’s professional judgment (IAASB 2015a, paragraph 8, 9), instead of providing the 
underlying assumption for the audit. Third, it seems reasonable to assume that KAM do not 
only affect auditor judgment in cases where KAM are de facto reported, but already when 
auditors just consider reporting KAM. That is because considering KAM involves taking the 
act of reporting into account, which should be sufficient to activate the respective cognitive 
processes in line with our theoretical argumentation. 
We check for the salience of our KAM consideration manipulation with a manipulation 
check question in the post-experimental questionnaire. We simply ask participants to select 
what task was part of the case study from four provided options. Two of the options relate to 
realistic, but for our experiment irrelevant, audit tasks (issuance of a going-concern opinion, 
assessment of the work of the internal audit function), while one option relates to the 
communication of matters as KAM/with those charged with governance, respectively. We only 
included those participants in our final analysis that were able to correctly indicate the task they 
faced. 
The independent variable client pressure is manipulated to be either high or low. In line 
with Hatfield et al. (2011), the manipulation contains the two different components, client 
importance and client opposition to making audit adjustments. When client pressure is 
manipulated to be low, the participants are informed that: 
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“Alpha is one of several larger clients you are in charge of as an engagement partner. 
Consequently, only a limited amount of your time will be dedicated to serving this client 
in the current year. Last year’s audit has shown, that, in general, Alpha’s CFO is not 
opposed to making audit adjustments”. 
In comparison, when client pressure is manipulated to be high, the participants are 
informed that: 
“Alpha is the only larger client you are in charge of as an engagement partner. 
Consequently, a significant amount of your time will be dedicated to serving this client 
in the current year. Last year’s audit has shown, that, in general, Alpha’s CFO is rather 
opposed to making audit adjustments.” 
Similar to Hatfield et al. (2011), we are not interested in understanding which of the two 
components of client pressure (client importance and client opposition) drives the construct, as 
this would be of minor relevance for our study. Consequently, to keep the amount of required 
participants low, we also do not combine low/high client importance with high/low client 
opposition in our experiment (Hatfield et al. 2011). 
In order to test for the effectiveness of our client pressure manipulation, we asked 
participants for their agreement ratings for the following three statements (on 5-points Likert 
scales with endpoints labeled as “agree completely” and “disagree completely”; see also 
Hatfield et al. 2011) in the post experimental questionnaire: (1) “Alpha is important to me as a 
client”, (2) “If I required an accounting adjustment from Alpha’s CFO, s/he would heavily 
complain”, and (3) “While considering Alpha’s estimation of the recoverable amount, I felt 
pressure to avoid requiring an accounting adjustment from Alpha’s CFO”. We find a significant 
difference in the expected direction in the mean assessments between the two client pressure 
conditions (low vs. high) for the second question only (one-tailed t-test, p = 0.069). Hence, we 
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can provide empirical evidence for a successful manipulation of the client pressure component 
client opposition. Since there are no significant differences between groups for the other client 
pressure related manipulation check questions, we have to acknowledge that our client pressure 
manipulation might be weaker than intended. While the utilized client pressure manipulation 
has been very successful in prior studies, because of the described findings, it might be fruitful 
for further research to develop an understanding for the conditions under which this client 
pressure manipulation works well. 
Dependent Variables 
We capture two facets of auditor judgment performance with our dependent variables. First, we 
asked participants to assess the reasonableness of Alpha’s estimation of the recoverable amount 
for the “Europe without Germany” cash generating unit (Griffith at al. 2015). Answers were to 
be provided on an 11-points Likert-scale with endpoints labeled as “not at all likely/extremely 
likely to be reasonable”. In terms of professional skepticism, this first dependent variable would 
relate to skeptical judgment (Nelson 2009). Second, we ask participants to indicate the 
likelihood that they will require Alpha to adjust the estimation of the recoverable amount (an 
11-points Likert-scale with endpoints labeled as “not at all likely/extremely likely” was 
provided for responses). The second dependent variable would relate to skeptical action in terms 
of professional skepticism (Nelson 2009). It is important to capture these two distinct aspects 
of auditor judgment performance (Shaub and Lawrence 2002), because “skeptical judgments 
need to reach a threshold to create action, and incentives associated with budget, time pressure, 
peer and superior, or client can prevent action” (Nelson 2009, 16). To avoid the possibility that 
we observe consistent response patterns for our dependent variables (i.e., low values for 
skeptical judgment and skeptical action) just because participants inattentively select the same 
response option on the scale for both questions, we phrased the questions so that low/high 
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values on the scale represent more skeptical judgment/action (see questions and endpoints 
above). 
 
4. Results 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Figure 2 outlines the descriptive results for our dependent variables.22 Descriptive results 
suggest that auditors’ reaction to our client pressure manipulation is rather weak. Although 
participants who consider KAM tend to assess the likelihood that the recoverable amount is 
reasonable to be marginally higher when client pressure is high, in an overall picture, if at all, 
auditors seem to become slightly more skeptical in their judgments and actions when client 
pressure is high. This direction of the effect would be contrary to our Hypothesis 1 and might 
suggest that a reasonableness constraint has been triggered. Auditors who perceive very salient 
client pressure might feel challenged in their self-image as independent professionals, making 
them become more skeptical in their judgments and actions (Koch and Salterio 2017; see also 
Kadous et al. 2003; Bauer 2015, Teoh 1992). 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
However, in separate ANOVAs for both dependent variables, we do not find significant 
differences between groups related to the client pressure manipulation (see Table 2 for more 
details with regard to skeptical judgment). Consequently, we are neither able to accept 
Hypothesis 1 nor can we provide evidence for a significant contrary effect indicative of a 
reasonableness constraint. Our results could suggest that the relatively experienced auditors in 
our sample are quite immune to client pressure. However, we want to underline that the success 
 
22 Observations are distributed across cells as follows: 16, 20, 20, and 17 in the KAM present/client pressure low, 
KAM present/client pressure high, KAM absent/client pressure low, and KAM absent/client pressure high 
condition. Since experimental materials were randomly handed out to participants, we neither expected nor find 
systematic differences between groups with regard to individual characteristics (age, gender, experience, etc.). 
24 
 
of our client pressure manipulation is uncertain. While the results for our manipulation check 
questions (see section “Independent Variables”) might suggest that our client pressure 
manipulation is weaker than intended, a possibly triggered reasonableness constraint would 
instead lead to the conclusion that the pressure was too salient. 
Descriptive results further suggest that auditors assess the likelihood that the 
recoverable amount is reasonable to be substantially higher when they consider KAM. 
Correspondingly, the data indicates that auditors assess the likelihood that they will require the 
client to adjust the estimation of the recoverable amount to be (slightly) lower when they 
consider KAM. A significant direct effect of KAM consideration (p = 0.0875) on the dependent 
variable skeptical judgment is confirmed by an ANOVA (see Table 2). However, we do not 
find significant differences between groups for the dependent variable skeptical action 
(ANOVAs regarding this variable are not tabulated). Consequently, as for skeptical judgment, 
we are able to support Hypothesis 2b: Auditors exhibit significantly less skeptical judgment 
when KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is absent. This suggests 
that, when considering KAM and due to moral licensing, auditors are more willing to acquiesce 
to their clients’ desired accounting treatments, believing either that KAM communication 
provides a defense for not requiring adjustments, or that KAM communication fulfills the 
auditors’ fiduciary duty to ensure that the investing public has been informed. Hence, our 
findings suggest that when auditors consider KAM, auditor judgment performance is impaired. 
Finally, we do not find significant interaction effects between the two independent variables 
KAM consideration and client pressure and we can consequently neither support H3a nor H3b 
(see Table 2; ANOVA results for the dependent variable skeptical action are not tabulated). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Tests of Mechanisms 
We also investigate the mechanisms through which KAM consideration and client pressure 
affect our dependent variables (skeptical judgment and skeptical action) and we are mainly 
interested in two factors as potential mediators: Goal commitment and work effort. Figure 3 
shows the path coefficients and the respective significance levels23 for the SEM that we 
estimated (n = 70).24  
As can be seen from Figure 3 (and Table 3), the SEM reveals that our client pressure 
manipulation has a significant positive impact on the likelihood that the auditors require an 
adjustment of the recoverable amount (p = 0.020, coef. = 0.919), which is in line with the 
descriptive results outlined above. Hence, high client pressure is associated with more skeptical 
action, which is indicative of a reasonableness constraint being triggered for our participants. 
Koch and Salterio (2017) argue that the effect high or explicit client pressure has on auditor 
judgment is an on-average effect which is contingent on an auditor’s perception of client 
pressure salience. In other words, the observable direction of the effect depends on whether the 
reasonableness constraint is triggered on average, or not. Taking furthermore into account that 
the observation of a reasonableness constraint implies salient client pressure, it does not seem 
very reasonable anymore to assume that our client pressure manipulation was too weak. Instead, 
we believe that our client pressure manipulation triggered the reasonableness constraint for a 
substantial proportion of our participants, but worked as intended for others, leading to the 
rather small on-average effect that we find. 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 here] 
 
23 The asterisks indicate significance levels as follows (two-tailed tests): *** 1 percent significance level; ** 5 
percent significance level; * 10 percent significance level. For the variables constituting the latent variable goal 
commitment, see also Table 1. All reported p-values are based on a two-tailed test.  
24 We estimate standard linear SEM (maximum likelihood) using STATA software. Due to missing values for 
variables that are included in the SEM, the n is smaller than the n reported for the tests of hypotheses. 
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Furthermore, consideration of KAM significantly increases participants’ assessment of 
the likelihood that the recoverable amount is reasonable (p = 0.036, coef. = 1.168), which is 
indicative of a moral licensing effect, and again supports Hypothesis 2b. The SEM now 
additionally sheds light on the mechanism being at work. First, consideration of KAM also 
significantly reduces the work effort exerted by participants (p = 0.014, coef. = -1.306), which 
is again indicative of a moral licensing effect as auditors seem to feel licensed to exert less 
effort and seem to have less motivation to conduct a thorough audit. In this regard, we can rule 
out that the effect is due to differences in group composition, as we test for, but do not find 
systematic differences between groups with regard to individual characteristics (age, gender, 
experience, etc.) of the participants. 
However, we can also show that (1) consideration of KAM significantly reduces goal 
commitment (p = 0.087, coef. = -0.2047). Goal commitment in turn (2) has a positive (albeit 
non-significant) effect on participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the recoverable amount 
is reasonable (p = 0.305, coef. = 0.873), and a significantly negative effect on the likelihood 
that the auditor requires an adjustment of the estimation of the recoverable amount (p = 0.077, 
coef. = -1.358). Considering the effects (1) and (2) together, KAM consideration might have 
the potential to lead to more skeptical action through a decrease of goal commitment. The 
outlined mechanism reflects exactly what we had hypothesized in Hypothesis 2a. Hence, while 
the moral licensing effect seems to be dominant, we can provide empirical evidence that KAM 
consideration also induces a reverse effect on auditors’ willingness to acquiesce to the client’s 
preferred accounting through goal commitment. Looking at the total effect KAM consideration 
has on participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the recoverable amount is reasonable 
further supports the notion of a reverse effect: the total effect is smaller than the direct effect 
reported above (p = 0.037, coef. = 1.081; untabulated). 
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Finally, not surprisingly, the path coefficient between skeptical judgment and skeptical 
action is highly significant (and negative, which makes perfect sense if the response scales 
underlying the variables are considered, see section “Dependent Variables”; p = 0.000, coef. = 
-0.623). In line with the implications of previous studies, the work effort exerted by the auditor 
significantly improves judgment performance, as it has a significantly positive impact on the 
likelihood that the auditor requires an adjustment of the estimation of the recoverable amount 
(p = 0.008, coef. = 0.232), and a (albeit non-significant) negative impact on the assessment of 
the likelihood that the recoverable amount is reasonable (p = 0.541, coef. = -0.070). 
With a total of 70 observations, we do not meet existing rules of thumb for the minimum 
sample size in structural equation modelling (e.g., 10 observations per indicator; Nunnally 
1967; Kahai and Cooper 2003), or even stricter sample size requirements (see Westland 2010 
for an overview). More generally, when sample sizes are under 100, nonconvergence and 
improper values might be a problem. However, sample sizes as small as n = 50 can produce 
reliable results under certain conditions (Hoyle and Gottfredson 2015) in SEM, and previous 
studies have worked with sample sizes comparable to or smaller than our sample size (van Raaij 
and Schepers 2006; So and Bolloju 2005; Venkatesh and Davis 2000; Yoo and Alavi 2001). 
Especially when the estimation converges – as in our case – concerns shift to the evaluation of 
fit (Hoyle and Gottfredson 2015). The likelihood ratio chi-square test that compares our model 
to a saturated model that has no degree of freedom is insignificant (p = 0.3349), which suggests 
that our model might fit the data well. The overall equation-level goodness of fit R2 is 0.2705. 
As we lose a significant amount of observations based on a manipulation check question (as 
outlined before), we included observations deleted for the described main analyses and reran 
the SEM for the additional analyses in the following section in order to mitigate a potential 
sample size concern. 
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Additional Analyses 
We conducted additional analyses to validate our results as well as the conclusions. Given the 
high complexity of our case, we repeated all described analyses with the most experienced 
auditors in our sample only. More specifically, if we only consider participants with a work 
experience in auditing above the median work experience in our sample (five years), the results 
and implications discussed for the tests of hypotheses generally do not change. Rather, the direct 
effect KAM consideration has on skeptical judgment becomes stronger and more significant (p 
= 0.01, n = 42). Unfortunately, the SEM does not converge for this partitioning of the sample 
because of the small n. 
If we instead add those participants to our sample who possess not more than six month 
of work experience in auditing, response patterns in the tests of hypotheses as well as 
mechanisms remain largely consistent, but significances diminish. Given the fact that our case 
actually requires a certain level of skills and knowledge in auditing, it is not very surprising that 
including a considerable proportion of rookies and interns in the analyses induces too much 
noise. 
As outlined before, we lose a number of observations by excluding those participants 
from further analyses who fail to indicate what task related to the KAM consideration 
manipulation was part of the case study. As participants tend to exert less effort in a post-
experimental questionnaire, especially when the case itself was challenging, failure to state 
whether they had to consider KAM, or not, might rather be indicative of inattentiveness, than 
of the ineffectiveness of our manipulation. Consequently, we reran all analyses and include 
participants that failed the respective manipulation check question and have more than six 
month of work experience in auditing. Response patterns in the tests of hypotheses remain 
consistent (n = 107). In fact, the direct effect KAM consideration has on skeptical judgment 
becomes more significant (p = 0.054). 
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Including more observations in the analyses is in particular relevant with regard to the 
SEM that we estimate for the tests of mechanisms to increase power of the results. Repeating 
the analyses with the above described sample (n = 101)25 reveals that the signs of all relevant 
path coefficients correspond with those reported in Table 3. While we again find that 
consideration of KAM significantly increases participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the 
recoverable amount is reasonable (p = 0.018, coef. = 1.050), and that work effort exerted by the 
auditor significantly improves judgment performance, as it has a significantly positive impact 
on the likelihood that the auditor requires an adjustment of the estimation of the recoverable 
amount (p = 0.01, coef. = 0.223), significances diminish for other path coefficients and fall 
short of a 10 percent significance level (p = 0.133 for the path coefficient between consideration 
of KAM and goal commitment; p = 0.142 for the path coefficient between consideration of 
KAM and work effort; p = 0.224 for the path coefficient between goal commitment and 
skeptical action). When we run the SEM with all observations (and hence disregard work 
experience in auditing), in addition to significant findings similar to those just described, we 
can further provide evidence for the effect of goal commitment on skeptical judgment (p = 
0.059, coef. = 1.043) and skeptical action (p = 0.094, coef. = -0.914; all results described in this 
section are untabulated). 
With our comprehensive additional analyses we want to (1) underline that the main 
effects of KAM consideration described in this paper are robust to meaningful partitioning of 
the full sample, and (2) to make transparent that the tests of mechanisms tend to be sensitive to 
sample composition. However, while more restrictive sample composition in the main analyses 
generates significant results, a sample dilution (i.e., the inclusion of less experienced 
auditors/auditors that fail the manipulation check question) generally does not change the 
 
25 Due to missing values for variables that are included in the SEM this n is smaller than the n reported for the tests 
of hypotheses. 
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observable pattern in mechanisms, but rather leads to diminishing significances for some path 
coefficients. 
 
5. Conclusion 
With our 2×2 between-subjects experiment with 73 experienced auditors from two Big4 audit 
firms in Germany we addressed the question of how considering KAM affects auditor judgment 
performance. We manipulated the two independent variables KAM consideration (present vs. 
absent) and client pressure (high vs. low) and investigated how they impact our dependent 
variables, two different facets of auditor judgment performance (skeptical judgment and 
skeptical action). 
Our main results are as follows: First, in the test of hypotheses, we do not find significant 
differences between groups related to the client pressure manipulation for both dependent 
variables. Consequently, we do not find evidence that auditors exhibit less skeptical judgment 
and action when client pressure is high than when client pressure is low (Hypothesis 1). Rather, 
in an overall (descriptive) picture, auditors seem to become slightly more skeptical in their 
judgments and actions when client pressure is high. This might suggest that a reasonableness 
constraint has been triggered. Tests of mechanisms, based on the estimation of a SEM, further 
support this conclusion.  
Second, we observe a significant direct effect of KAM consideration on the dependent 
variable skeptical judgment. However, we do not find significant differences between groups 
for the dependent variable skeptical action. Consequently, as for skeptical judgment, we are 
able to support Hypothesis 2b: Auditors exhibit significantly less skeptical judgment when 
KAM consideration is present than when KAM consideration is absent. This suggests that, 
when considering KAM and due to moral licensing, auditors are more willing to acquiesce to 
their clients’ desired accounting treatments, believing either that KAM communication 
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provides a defense for not requiring adjustments, or that KAM communication fulfills the 
auditors’ fiduciary duty to ensure that the investing public has been informed. Hence, our 
findings suggest that when auditors consider KAM, auditor judgment performance is impaired. 
Furthermore, we also investigated the mechanisms through which KAM consideration 
and client pressure affect our dependent variables whereby we focused on the two factors goal 
commitment and work effort as potential mediators. In this regard, we can show that (1) 
consideration of KAM significantly reduces goal commitment, which in turn (2) has a positive 
(albeit non-significant) effect on participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the recoverable 
amount is reasonable (skeptical judgment), and a significantly negative effect on the likelihood 
that the auditor requires an adjustment of the estimation of the recoverable amount (skeptical 
action). Considering the effects (1) and (2) together, KAM consideration might have the 
potential to lead to more skeptical action through a decrease of goal commitment (in line with 
Hypothesis 2a). Hence, while the moral licensing effect seems to be dominant, we can provide 
empirical evidence that KAM consideration also induces a reverse effect on auditors’ 
willingness to acquiesce to the client’s preferred accounting through goal commitment. Finally, 
we find that consideration of KAM also significantly reduces the work effort exerted by 
participants, which is again indicative of a moral licensing effect, as auditors seem to feel 
licensed to exert less effort and seem to have less motivation to conduct a thorough audit. 
Overall, our findings suggest that KAM reporting requirements might have side effects. 
By showing that KAM consideration leads to less skeptical judgment, we document that the 
new KAM reporting requirement – intended to improve the communicative value of the 
auditor’s report for users (IAASB 2012) – comes at the expense of auditor judgment 
performance. It seems as if auditors who consider KAM feel morally licensed to acquiesce to 
clients’ desired accounting treatments. This finding is of interest for auditors and regulators, as 
well as users and prepares, by highlighting unintended consequences of KAM reporting. 
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Of course, our study is not without limitations. First of all, when we test for the 
effectiveness of our client pressure manipulation, we can only provide empirical evidence for 
a successful manipulation of the client pressure component client opposition, but not for client 
importance. Hence, we have to acknowledge that our client pressure manipulation might be 
weaker than intended.  While the utilized client pressure manipulation has been very successful 
in prior studies, because of the described findings, it might be fruitful for further research to 
develop an understanding for the conditions under which this client pressure manipulation 
works well. 
Second, with a total of 70 observations that we use to estimate our SEM in the tests of 
mechanisms, we do not meet existing rules of thumb for the minimum sample size in structural 
equation modelling. However, as argued, previous studies have worked with sample sizes 
comparable to or smaller than our sample size. Furthermore, to mitigate a potential sample size 
concern, i.e. to validate our findings, in additional analyses, we included observations deleted 
for the main analyses and reran the SEM, and the results remain largely consistent. 
Finally, as in every experiment, we have to acknowledge the risk that our results are 
driven by the specific design and content of the case. Hence, an interesting avenue for future 
research might be to look at the effects of KAM consideration on auditor judgment performance 
in the context of auditing a variety of complex estimates.  
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Goal commitment measurement 
 
 
  
Variable in SEM Item to Provide Agreement Rating Response Scale
X1 I thought this was a good goal to shoot for.
X2 I was strongly committed to pursuing this goal.
X3 It was hard to take this goal seriously.
X4 Quite frankly, I didn’t care if I achieved this goal or not.
X5 It wouldn’t have taken much to make me abandon this goal.
Disagree
completely
= 1
Agree
completely
= 5
Goal Commitment Question and Goal
There are several plausible goals that you could have had while considering Alpha’s estimation of the 
recoverable amount. Please indicate how important the following goal was to you by rating the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement for the following goal.
Goal: Build a justifiable case for characterizing Alpha’s estimation of the recoverable amount to be 
acceptable in the circumstances.
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TABLE 2 
ANOVA results for dependent variable skeptical judgment 
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F 
Model 18.6104 3 6.2035 1.22 0.3075 
   
Client Pressure 0.0827 1 0.0827 0.02 0.8987 
KAM Consideration 15.2189 1 15.2189 3.00 0.0875 
Interaction Term 3.1525 1 3.1525 0.62 0.4329 
   
Residual 349.6089 69 5.0668  
Total 368.2192 72 5.1142  
 
Number of observations = 73 R-squared = 0.0505 
 Adj. R-squared = 0.0093 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of results 
 
 
  
Constructa Predictor Path Coefficient z P>│z│
Client Pressure 0.0353 0.07 0.946 -0.9811 1.0518
KAM Consideration 1.1679 2.10 0.036 0.0779 2.2579
Goal Commitment 0.8735 1.03 0.305 -0.7944 2.5413
Work Effort -0.0704 -0.61 0.541 -0.2965 0.1556
Client Pressure 0.9190 2.32 0.020 0.1427 1.6954
KAM Consideration 0.2508 0.57 0.567 -0.6089 1.1105
Skeptical Judgment -0.6233 -6.79 0.000 -0.8033 -0.4433
Goal Commitment -1.3575 -1.77 0.077 -2.8626 0.1475
Work Effort 0.2319 2.63 0.008 0.0592 0.4046
Goal Commitment Client Pressure 0.0802 0.78 0.433 -0.1204 0.2808
KAM Consideration -0.2047 -1.71 0.087 -0.4391 0.0297
Work Effort Client Pressure 0.3557 0.67 0.505 -0.6908 1.4023
KAM Consideration -1.3060 -2.45 0.014 -2.3522 -0.2599
Likelyhood ratio test of model vs. saturated: chi2 (24) = 26.36, Prob > chi2 = 0.3349
Overall equation-level goodness of fit: R2 = 0.2705
aMeasurement level has been omitted for clarity.
[95 % Confidence Interval]
Likelihood that 
recoverable amount 
is reasonable
(skeptical judgment)
Liquelihood to 
require adjustment 
(skeptical action)
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 Structural Equation Model - Outline. 
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Figure 2 Descriptive results for dependent variables. 
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Figure 3 Structural Equation Model - Results. 
 
 
